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Abstract: Flood risk emerges from the dynamic interaction between natural hazards and human vulnerability.
Methods for the quantification of flood risk are well established, but tend to deal with human and economic
vulnerability as being static or changing with an exogenously defined trend. In this paper we present an Agent-
BasedModel (ABM) developed to simulate the dynamical evolution of flood risk and vulnerability, and facilitate
an investigation of insurance mechanism in London. The ABM has been developed to firstly allow an analysis
of the vulnerability of homeowners to surface water flooding, which is one of the greatest short-term climate
risks in the UKwith estimated annual costs of £1.3bn to £2.2bn. These costs have been estimated to increase by
60-220% over the next 50 years due to climate change and urbanisation. Vulnerability is influenced by home-
owner’s decisions tomovehouseand/or installmeasures toprotect their properties from flooding. Inparticular,
the ABM focuses on the role of flood insurance, simulating the current public-private partnership between the
government and insurers in theUK, and the forthcoming re-insurance schemeFloodRe, designed as a roadmap
to support the future aordability and availability of flood insurance. The ABM includes interaction between
homeowners, sellers and buyers, an insurer, a local government and a developer. Detailed GIS and qualitative
data of the London borough of Camden are used to represent an area at high risk of surface water flooding.
The ABM highlights how future development can exacerbate current levels of surface water flood risk in Cam-
den. Investment in flood protection measures are shown to be beneficial for reducing surface water flood risk.
The Flood Re scheme is shown to achieve its aim of securing aordable flood insurance premiums, however, is
placed under increasing pressure in the future as the risk of surface water flooding continues to increase.
Keywords: Flooding, London, Flood Insurance, Flood Re, Agent-Based Modelling
Introduction
1.1 Flooding is themost expensivenatural disasterworldwide. Flooding canoccur in various forms, suchas coastal,
river and surfacewater flooding (sometimes knownas ‘urban’ or ‘stormwater’ flooding). Surfacewater flooding
occurs when an urban area floods during heavy rainfall as a result of a combination of factors, including rain-
water not infiltrating the ground and the overflowing of sewers, drainage and small watercourses (European
Water Association 2014; Falconer et al. 2009).
1.2 Flooding is listedasamajor riskonEngland’sNationalRiskRegister,withpropertiesmore likely tobeaectedby
repeated surface water flooding then coastal or river flooding, with estimated annual costs of £1.3bn to £2.2bn
(Defra 2011). In England the consequences of surface water flooding were brought to the forefront by the sum-
mer floods of 2007. The Pitt Review (Pitt 2008), whichwas conducted to provide lessons and recommendations
in the aermath of the 2007 summer floods, highlightedmajor gaps in the understanding andmanagement of
risks from surfacewater flooding and emphasised the need for urgent and fundamental changes in theway the
UK is adapting to the likelihood of more frequent and intense periods of heavy rainfall, particularly given the
impact that climate change would have on the probability of similar events in the future.
1.3 Findings presented in the UK Climate Projections (UKCP09) show that as a result of climate change the UK
weather in the upcoming century will be characterized bymore days of extreme precipitation during thewinter
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and summer period (IPCC 2013). These changing precipitation patterns are expected to result in an increase in
surface water flood events in the UK (Ramsbottom et al. 2012). Combined with an increasing pattern of urban-
isation Defra estimated that damages from surface water flooding could increase by 60-220% over the next 50
years (Adaptation Sub-Committee 2012).
1.4 Flood risk emerges from the interplay between biophysical and human factors (Hall et al. 2003b). Biophysical
factors determine the frequency, duration and intensity of rainfall, and the runo that occurswhen rain hits the
ground. Rainfall may be infiltrated into the ground, but in urban areas with impermeable surfaces will flow on
the surface in directionsmodified by the formof buildings and streets andwill accumulate at locationswith low
topographical elevation. These processes are modified by drains that are designed to convey water away from
urban areas on the surface or in pipes (Blanc et al. 2012). The severity of damage that occurs during a surface
water flood depends upon the location and value of properties in an urban area and their sensitivity to flood
damage. The amount of damage that occurs may be reduced by installing Property-level Protection Measures
(PLPMs) that prevent water from entering buildings or reduce the costs of repair, as well as by flood defences
and sustainable drainage systems (SUDS) designed to protect entire communities.
1.5 Flood insurance helps to ensure that insurance policy-holders do not incur disastrous financial losses during
floods. It redistributes losses across the pool of policy-holders and through time. Typically, a householder will
pay an annual premium. The cost of repair of flood damage will be reimbursed by the insurance scheme, less
some pre-agreed threshold sum (an ‘excess’, or ‘deductible’). Flood insurance arrangements, where they exist
at all, dier widely around the world, with varying levels of public and private involvement in the insurance
market (Botzen & Van Den Bergh 2008). In recent years, flood insurance has been provided in the UK via a
public-private partnership between the UK government and the insurance industry, known as the Statement of
Principles. Private insurers provide flood insurance to both households and small business up to a certain level
of risk, while the government commits to investing in flood defences for the higher risk areas. However, with
the increase in frequency and extent of flooding there was a need within the UK for a continued, but redefined,
public-private partnership. If no action was taken then it raised the issue of aordability and availability of
insurance as high flood risk properties could face increasing premiums, potentially to unaordable levels, or
the refusal of cover altogether (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2014).
1.6 In the summer of 2013 the government proposed a new flood insurance scheme, Flood Re, due to be in opera-
tion from April 2016. The Flood Re scheme is a non-profit flood reinsurance fund that gives insurers the option
to re-insure the highest risk properties. The subsidy for Flood Re is to be claimed from a levy taken from all pol-
icyholders and imposed on the insurers according to theirmarket share, with policy-holder premiums fixed de-
pendenton the council taxbandof theproperty insured. Theaimof this proposed system is to create a roadmap
to future aordability and availability of flood insurance without placing unsustainable costs on wider policy
holders and the taxpayer (Defra 2013). Flood Re is proposed as a transitional solution, with an anticipated run
time of 25 years, helping to smooth the transition to more risk-based pricing in the future. However, concerns
have arisen over the financial sustainability of the scheme given that costs will remain higher than benefits de-
livered (Defra 2013). Secondly, Flood Re is not designed with risk reduction in mind, and it oers no incentives
or formalmechanisms to encourage household level flood risk reduction (Surminski & Eldridge 2015). Similarly,
implicationsof the scheme, andpotential negative andpositive feedbacks, havenot been considered inparallel
with other flood risk management interventions, including those targeted at surface water flooding.
1.7 This gap is the starting point of our investigation. Analysing the outcomes of such insurance reform requires a
model that can simulate the dynamics of flooding and the choices made by economic agents. Typically flood
risk is calculated using static data on properties at risk and the damage that will occur during a flood (Hall et al.
2003a). However, such an approach does not address the distribution of losses across dierent householders
and the role of insurance in redistributing those losses. Nor does it address the dynamics of householders’
locational choices and theways inwhich those choicesmay bemodified by flood risk and insurance availability
(Dawson et al. 2011). In this paper we address these issues by proposing and demonstrating an agent-based
model (ABM) designed to analyse changing flood risk and the role of insurance in this dynamic.
The Agent-Based Model
2.1 ABMshave had limited application in the insurance sector to date and to the authors best knowledge no studies
existwhichare focusexplicitly on the issueof surfacewater flooding. Ulbinaité&LeMoullec (2010) andUlbinaité
et al. (2011) used an ABM to simulate consumer behaviour and insurance choices in general. Brouwers & Boman
(2011) developed an ABMwhich focused on fluvial flood risk and damage to private property for a case study of
the Upper Tisza area in Hungary. The model considers how government, insurer, and property owner agents
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interact to investigate financial flood riskmanagement policies. In particular, it investigates a baseline scenario
where the government compensates property level flood damage and a market scenario where responsibility
is shied to the property owner.
2.2 Sobiech (2013) developed an ABM of coastal flooding in North Germany, focussed on simulating and exploring
the dynamics of social vulnerability. The ABMwas parametrised using survey data and included the perceptual
and social context in which decisions are taken, and subjective and objective aspects that may influence self-
protective behaviour and vulnerability of individuals. For risk research and management, it highlighted the
importance of considering multiple factors within the vulnerability analysis, and the importance of doing so in
a dynamic manner.
2.3 McNamara & Keeler (2013) highlight how such ABMs could be strengthened by linking behavioural and physical
models. They present a study for the US East Coast linking a shoreline dynamics model and ABM of real-estate
markets to investigate how people and the market respond to sea-level rise and storminess. The model com-
bines adaptation in the form of coastal defences within both the physical and economic components of the
model. Person agents make a cost-benefit based decision on whether to invest in defences, and to what level,
as well as valuing property based on various criteria such as expected flood damage and flood insurance costs.
2.4 Filatova et al. (2009, 2011) used an ABM to look at the consequences of a lack of available flood insurance on
flood risk and landmarkets, and built upon this to develop an empirical based ABM of an urban economic sys-
tem focusedon thehousingmarket (Filatova2015). This hasbeenapplied toacase studyofNorthCarolina, USA,
and includes flood risk in the decision making of household buyers, as well as consideration of potential flood
damage and insurance premiums. Similarly, an ABMhas been developed for a coastal town inNew Jersey, USA,
the that looks at the eect of sea level rise and alternative flood insurance programs on household locational
choices (Chandra-Putra et al. 2015). The ABM aims to capture some of the main features of the housing mar-
ket driven by interactions between buyers and sellers; responses to flooding and alternative flood insurance
policies; and implications of dierent government policies and the provision of flood risk information.
2.5 The ABM presented here is novel in its application to a case study of London. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the ABM with its key processes and interactions. The model captures the working of a local housing market
that is aected by surface water flooding, and represents the characteristics and present situation in the UK,
and specifically London. The modelling of the housing market followed the approach used by Chandra-Putra
et al. (2015) in that it adopts the experimental economics of a double auction market. However, the double
auctionmarket module from Chandra-Putra et al. (2015) was re-written to reflect specific characteristics of the
study area and to enhance eiciency given the large size of the model. For example, it was re-coded to reflect
the UKmortgage system; the specific characteristics of the housingmarket so that prices reflected the dierent
areas of Camden rather than being related to geographical aspects such as proximity to water and elevation;
and theway house prices change in themodel based on previous sales wasmademore eicient given the large
number of households. While the code was re-written and parametrised for the case study presented here,
the dynamics of how homebuyers place bids and sellers place asking prices, how they bid against each other,
buying and selling decisions, and the role of the Bank agent remain similar (highlighted in italics in Figure 1).
2.6 Themodel also includes an elaborate insurance system including themechanisms underlying the forthcoming
Flood Re system, and models the role of the developer and the local government in terms of influencing the
built environment, investment in flood risk reduction measures, and the vulnerability of homeowners in this
dynamic. The ABM also benefits from the incorporation of a surface water flood event dataset, for present and
future climate scenarios, developed by combining probabilistic precipitation projections with detailed surface
water flood depth maps (Jenkins et al. 2015). Finally, the presented model is GIS explicit to allow a realistic
representation of the built environment and surface water flood risk.
2.7 Further details are provided in the sections below aimed at introducing the ABM, its application, and main in-
sights. The construction of the model is done using NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). A copy of the model and further
documentation, including full tables of parameters, data values and sources, decision trees, validation of the
model and significance testing is available in Dubbelboer (2014), and online at
https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/1/view. An ODD Protocol describing agents, model variables,
the model process and scheduling, design concepts, initialisation and inputs is included in the Appendix.
Model environment
2.8 ABMshavebeen consideredweak in thepast due to limited applicationof empirical data toparameterisemodel
attributes and validate results. However, these connections are essential if ABMs are to be applied for policy
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Figure 1: Overview of the model structure.
analysis and be seen as robust when exploring future changes in systems e.g. due to climate impacts and adap-
tation policies (Filatova 2015). As such, this ABM is parameterised based on a large array of data sources and
developed around GIS data to allow a realistic representation of residential buildings and surface water flood
risk.
2.9 The ABM presented here has been developed for Greater London where the increased population and reduced
urban surface permeability due to densifying development mean that London’s aging drainage systems are
under pressure, and the risk of surface water flooding is particularly acute. Around 680,000 properties are esti-
mated to be at risk with 140,000 Londoners at high risk, and another 230,000 at medium risk (Greater London
Authority 2014). According to theGreater LondonAuthority (GLA), surfacewater flooding is themost likely cause
of a floodevent and is probably the greatest short-termclimate risk for the greater Londonarea (Greater London
Authority 2009, 2011a).
2.10 In this paper the ABM is applied to a case study of the London Borough of Camden. This encompasses an area
of 21.8 km2 and apopulation of approximately 228,400people (Greater LondonAuthority 2015b). Surfacewater
flooding poses a large risk to Camden due to the nature of summer thunderstorms and the topography of the
area, with a historic precedent for such events (Drain London 2014). The area is not at risk of flooding from the
River Thames or any other open rivers.
2.11 The study used GIS data from the LondonDatastore (Greater London Authority 2015c), residential building data
from (Landmap 2014) and derived data from the UK Buildings Residential Building Class Dataset1, and detailed
surface water flood depth maps generated by the GLA Drain London Project (Greater London Authority 2015b).
In Figure 2 the interface of themodel canbe seen inwhich theGIS data provides the boundary of theBoroughof
Camden; locations of residential houses;major parks anddesignateddevelopment areas. This sets up an initial
modelling environment with 95,561 houses of 4 dierent types; detached, semi-detached, terraced and flats.
The ABM includes six dierent agents: people, houses2, an insurer, a bank, a developer and a local government,
each with their own behaviour (summarised in Table 1 and outlined below).
Modelled Agents
2.12 Each unit of time, or "tick" in the model represents a year. Within this year all agents perform tasks based on
the information that is provided to them as outlined below and summarised in Table 1.
Persons
2.13 Each person can be classified as a homeowner, buyer or seller and performs tasks depending on the class they
are. Homeowners start by renewing their annual flood insurance. For this they ask the insurer agent to calculate
their flood insurancepremiumand flood insuranceexcess. All homeownersare required tohave flood insurance
in the model. This reflects the current situation in the UK where home insurance (which incorporates flood
insurance) is a pre-requisite for obtaining a mortgage, resulting in a high flood insurance penetration rate of
95% (Lamond & Penning-Rowsell 2014). As such, in the model homeowners will always accept the quotes they
get from the insurer and the insurer cannot deny providing someone flood insurance.
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Figure 2: Interface representation of the study area of Camden and its location within Greater London (inset).
The map of Camden also highlights the location of residential buildings (shading reflects dierent property
types: red=flats; orange=terraced, green=detached; and yellow=semi-detached), large areas of green space
(shaded green), and opportunity areas designated for future large scale development (shaded blue).
2.14 Aer insuring their house, a homeowner can decide to sell the house. A homeowner has three dierentmotives
for deciding to sell their house in the model. Firstly, if their annual fees are higher than the income they can
spend on the house for three consecutive years the house is foreclosed and sold to the Bank. Secondly, if they
can make a suitable profit on their house homeowners would look to sell. The homeowner will check if the
house value is at least 10% higher than the value paid following the assumption of Chandra-Putra et al. (2015).
If this is the case, people who can make a profit will sell for this reason. Thirdly, a percentage of homeowners
may decide to sell regardless of profit if they wish to move to a dierent location. The percentage of movers
for these reasons is set at 2.7% of homeowners annually, estimated based on information for Camden from the
ONS (2014) and Greater London Authority (2015c).
2.15 If a homeowner decides not to sell her house shewill then decidewhether to invest in PLPMs tomake the house
more flood resistant and resilient. Anxiety and insecurity about floods is assumed to play the most important
role in the decision to invest in PLPMs. As such, in the model it is assumed that 34% of people aected by
flooding will invest in PLPMs aer the event (Harries 2012), and based on availability of government grants,
while 1%of people invest proactively inPLPMs (basedonexpert opinion andanalysis of data fromDefra (2008)).
2.16 If a homeowner does decide to sell her house she becomes a home seller andwill put her house on themarket.
When ahome seller has found a suitable homebuyer shewill not simply leave themarket but instead can re-join
themarket as a homebuyer. Additionally, external homebuyers can also enter themarket. The total number of
homebuyers was based on projected population trends for Camden to 2041, which also accounts for national
and international migration (Greater London Authority 2015a). In this way people can stay within or join the
modelled market, which puts pressure on the housing market as is the present case in England (Inman 2014).
2.17 Homebuyers search for a house to buy every year. Similar to assumptions made by Chandra-Putra et al. (2015)
it is assumed that a homebuyer’s search is driven primarily by themost expensive house they can aord to buy.
It is also assumed that theywill prefer new build developments, and search for a specific house type prioritised
as detached, semi-detached, terraced and flat. Homebuyers may also consider flood risk in their purchase
decision. In England and Wales this information is obtainable online in the form of detailed flood risk maps
maintained by the Environment Agency, and estate agents are required to communicate to buyers any recent
flooding incidents. Based on survey data it is assumed in themodel that 57% of homebuyers would investigate
the flood risk of a property they considered buying (Home Check 2012). However, the implications of this are
not clear, particularly for Londonwhere due to the unprecedented demand for housing evidence suggests that
flood risk has limited if any lasting eect on the saleability and value of property. Given these uncertainties, it
is assumed that homebuyers look back at the flood history of a house for the past three years, withmore recent
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events having a larger eect on their behaviour (Lamond et al. 2009). Homebuyers that consider flood risk will
not buy a property if it has flooded in that year. Where a house was flooded in the previous year only 50% of
risk adverse homebuyers will consider buying it. For flooding 2 years ago this percentage drops to 25%.
Insurer
2.18 The main task of the insurer is to provide every agent owning a house (person agents, the bank or the devel-
oper) with flood insurance. In the ABM we assume that an insurer has detailed information that provides an
estimate of surface water flood risk (see flood risk modelling below). Based on that risk estimate the insurance
premium and excess can be calculated for each household. In this analysis we only model the technical side of
flood insurance andnot the commercial side (i.e. competitionbetween insurerswhichmightmodify the oered
premium). As we are focussing on surface water flooding we limit the insurer’s attention to the surface water
flood history of a house and the estimated surface water flood risk.
2.19 The insurer first sets the flood insurance excess for all houses. The assumption ismade that the flood insurance
excess amount is non-negotiable and will initially be equal to £200 per household per year. Houses hit during
a surface water flood event will see their insurance excesses increase by 1/3rd, to a maximum of £2500, as nor-
mally the excess would not be more than that as homeowners would not be able to get a mortgage (House of
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Aairs Committee 2013).
2.20 The surface water flood risk estimates are summed across all aected houses in the model representing the
insurers expected annual loss. The insurer deducts from this the total value of excesses paid and the total base
flood insurance premium paid by all households in the model, assumed to be £50 per house per year. The
remaining loss that has to be covered is spread across the households at risk of surface water flooding, by in-
creasing their flood insurance premiumproportionally to the flood risk they are in. In this way people owning a
house in surface water flood risk will receive a higher flood insurance premium. Insurance premiums are calcu-
lated at each time step andwill reflect the dynamic nature of surfacewater flood risk in themodel. For example,
due to changes in the built environment and investment in PLPMs and SUDS which can alter the level of flood
damage and risk to properties.
2.21 Insurers typically pass on risks above a set threshold by purchasing reinsurance on the global market. In this
case study the Flood Re scheme represents a government designed reinsurance entity. When switched on in
the ABM the insurer has the option to re-insure eligible properties (built pre-2009) into Flood Re. The insurer
will have to pay to re-insure a household into Flood Re with a fixed premium per policy capped dependent on
the property value (approximated according to the local property council tax rate ranging from £210 to £540 in
the study area) (Defra 2013). In this way the total compensation the insurer pays following a flood will be lower
when the Flood Re option is selected, as they are no longer required to compensate the highest risk houses.
2.22 In the model there are no constraints on the available assets of the Insurer or the Flood Re Scheme, with both
able to go into debt. This is captured in this way as throughout the Flood Re consultations concerns have arisen
over the financial sustainability of Flood Re given that costs will remain higher than benefits delivered (Defra
2013). As such, potential costs and the economic implications of the scheme can be investigated for dierent
scenarios.
Developer
2.23 Themain task of the developer is to build new housing projects and to sell the houses it builds. Aer the hous-
ing market is run within a tick of the model, the developer will look at the demand for housing and available
properties on the market and build houses to meet the unmet demand. A simplification in the model is that
house development is done on a house-by-house basis and not based on projects in whichmultiple houses are
built at the same time.
2.24 Other ABMs have focused specifically on developer decision making. For example, in terms of the mix, timing
and intensity of developments based on the developer’s characteristics, available site characteristics, market
conditions, and the regulatory environment (e.g., Parker et al. 2015;Magliocca et al. 2014). In this study themain
driver for a developer building properties is profit. For every house the developer wants to build they will try
to find the optimal location. This is defined as available land with the highest economic value of surrounding
houses. Given the specific application of the ABM to London and Camden the developers decision making is
limited as the locational choices and intensity of developments is based on the GIS maps of planned oppor-
tunity areas (Figure 2) and data on development targets set by the national and local government. Within the
opportunity areas the developer is free to build as many houses as optimal per year, with a maximum limit on
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total houses (Camden Council 2015). Outside of the development areas the developer is limited by amaximum
number of houses it can build per year (150-200) reflecting the planned housing trajectory of Camden (Camden
Council 2013).
2.25 Once the developer has chosen a location to build a house they assess if it is profitable. If the estimatedmarket
valueof thehouse is at least 20%higher than thebuild cost theywill createadevelopmentproposal for approval
by the local government. If the government approves thedevelopment proposal (see Local Government below)
the developer will start building the house. The building of a house is assumed to take one year, aer which
the developer puts the house on sale for the estimated market value. Land value, the type of house to build,
and the house price once completed are calculated based on the characteristics and values of the surrounding
houses. When it comes to flood risk one important assumption made here is that the building of new houses
does not influence the flood risk of houses surrounding the development. Based on reports for London it is
initially assumed that 50% of all new build houses will be built with flood defences in the form of SUDS (Defra
2011).
Local government
2.26 The main task of the local government in the model is to protect people living in the Borough against floods.
The local government aims to reduce flood risk through investment in PLPMs (implemented by homeowners
and linked to government funded grants) and surfacewater flood reduction projects in the formof SUDS. Based
on available literature it is initially assumed that these measures will reduce household flood damage by 75%
(Thurston et al. 2008) and 35% (Defra 2011) respectively. The amount of assets the local government can spend
on SUDS and PLPM grants every year is equal to the annual subsidy they receive from the national government
and a small percentage of their income from selling land to the developer and collecting property taxes from
home owners. Initially it is assumed that up to 80% of this budget can be spent annually on SUDS and 20%
for PLPM grants. Based on past funding for flood repair and renewal grants in the UK it is assumed that each
person can receive up to £5000 to invest in PLPMs (Defra 2014).
2.27 Every year the local government will proactively search for SUDS projects to invest in. Every project consists of
aminimumof 100 houses that are in close proximity to each other. The projects are selected based on the flood
risk of houses and the benefit-cost ratio that the local government would achieve for each project. From the 10
projects the local government will try to build as many as it can within its available budget, starting with the
projects with the highest benefit-cost ratio. The second task of the local government is the evaluation of de-
velopment proposals. Just as development proposals are made on a house-by-house basis, the proposals are
evaluated in the sameway. Although regulation on approving development proposals states that local govern-
ments should consider flood risk, figures indicate that in 75% of cases flood risk is not looked at (Wynn 2005).
As such, a development proposal will be approved by the local government in 75% of all cases. In remaining
cases the development proposal will be approved if the flood risk of the development is lower than the govern-
ments acceptable maximum flood risk. If this is not the case the development proposal can still be approved
based on the profitability of the land sale to the local government. This reasoning reflects the current pressure
local governments are put under by central government to developmore houseswithin their borough (Camden
Council 2013; Greater London Authority 2011b), and highlights trade-oswhichmust bemadewhen addressing
flood risk and housing shortages.
Bank
2.28 The task of the bank is to foreclose on houses if the owner was not able to aord their house fees for three
consecutive years, following the approach of Chandra-Putra et al. (2015). Aer foreclosing on a house the bank
puts the house up for sale at its current value. Table 1 summarizes the main agent behaviours included in the
model.
Flood Damage Data
2.29 Data on the residential properties in Camden which would be aected by surface water flooding, and the sub-
sequent economic damages, are calculated based on the Drain London flood depth maps. By overlaying the
spatial floodmaps onto the residential building data properties at risk of surface water flooding, and the flood
depth, were identified. Economic damages to residential buildings were estimated using flood depth-damage
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Agent Main Behaviours
Person Decide to buy or sell properties Required to renew flood insurance annually Pay house-
hold fees Decide whether to invest in PLPMs (assumed that 1% of homeowners invest
proactively per year, while 34% invest reactively following a flood) May consider flood
risk when considering to purchase a new property
Insurer Estimates household surface water flood risk for every property in model (where in
place they account for PLPMs and SUDs in these estimates) Sets insurance premiums
and excess levels for every property in model Provides all households with flood in-
surance Decide whether it is cost eective to place high risk properties into Flood Re
Provide compensation, minus the excess, to properties following a flood event
Local Government Invest up to 80% of their local flood defence budget (or more in the year of a flood
event) in SUDS projects which protect houses at highest risk of flooding and provide a
cost-benefit ratio of 1:5 or greater Invest up to 20% of their local flood defence budget
to provide £5000 grants to households investing in PLPMs Evaluate and approve/reject
property development plans based on their financial benefits and flood risk Sell land
to developers for approved property developments
Developer If demand for new properties outstrips available properties on the market propose
to build new properties to meet demand Identify optimal land to maximise profits
from developments, within allocated development areas and the local governments
planned development trajectory Submit development proposal to be approved by the
local government Build new houses (initially assumed that 50% of all houses built will
have SUDS) and sell on the market
Bank Reposes houses if theowners are unable to aordhousehold fees for three consecutive
years Sell houses onmarket
Table 1: Summary table of main agent behaviours
functions for short (<12hr) duration floods (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010). This provides an estimate of dam-
ages to residential building fabric and contents based on building type and age. As such, when a surface water
flood event of given severity is projected to occur the residential properties aected and corresponding flood
damages are readily known.
2.30 Initial houses in the model are also assigned a surface water flood history. The length of the flood history is
dependent on thebuild year of theproperty, and reflects a randomtime slice from thebaseline floodevent time
series. The household damage for given return periods do not change under the future climate scenarios (just
the frequency of events of this magnitude). To illustrate the eect of climate change the change in probability
of surface water flood events of a given magnitude are estimated and accounted for in the probability damage
curves and subsequent estimates of risk.
Flood Risk Modelling
2.31 Based on the economic damage to houses for given flood events, every house in themodel has a level of flood
risk assigned to it. This flood risk is recalculated every year to reflect the dynamic changes in themodel includ-
ing investment in flood protection measures and the creation of new houses. The flood risk of every house is





where,D(xt) is a damage function with x changing overtime, f(xt) is the flood probability distribution.
2.32 To create a damage-probability graph for each house using the formula above, assumptions are made given
only three flood return periods (1 in 30, 1 in 100, and 1 in 200) are available. Namely, it is assumed that the func-
tion is linear between the three known points. As the damage probability functionwill never have a probability
of zero the function is forced to meet the axis by assuming that the damage with zero probability is the maxi-
mum damage that can be done to a house. There are many factors which would influence this at a household
level, andgivena lackof data this is currently assumed tobe20%of thebuilding value. The slopeof the function
is assumed to extend horizontally until it crosses the x axis (damage). A maximum limit is put on this assuming
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that it is highly unlikely that a house will be hit by a flood more than once every 2 years (i.e. 50% probability).
Household flood risk is then calculated as the area under the line.
Experimental Setup
3.1 TheABMhasbeendeveloped to investigate surfacewater flood risk in Londonandassess the interplay between
dierent adaptation options; how risk reduction could be achieved by homeowners and the local government;
and the role of flood insurance and the forthcoming Flood Re scheme. In order to test and validate the ABM
an initial assessment was made of the potential role of PLPMs and SUDS, and Flood Re for managing surface
water flood risk. The ABM interface was designed to allow these options to be ‘switched on and o’ and tested
individually and in combination to explore potential negative and positive feedbacks which could occur when
adaptation options and insurancemechanisms are considered in parallel. Themodelwas run using flood event
time series data for the baseline (1961-1990) and the 2030s and 2050s high emission climate change scenarios,
run at a yearly time-step for 100 simulations of the 30-year time series data so as to sample stochastic variability
in the flood event series.
3.2 As ABMcanbe chaoticwith results varying between runs it is recommended to explore the variability in outputs
by performing many repetitions (Van Dam et al. 2012). The 300 repetitions that are performed here for every
experiment provide amore accurate representation of the behaviours in themodel, as well as representing un-
certainty in the climate scenarios. Given themodel size, complexity, andmultiple simulations required the ABM
was run on a state-of-the-art high-performance computer facility. The data analysis was carried out using the
free and open source program R. Output metrics were collected annually, including number of houses in flood
risk; flood risk level; flood damage; flood insurance premium cost; number of houses re-insured in FloodRe;




4.1 The ABM allows an investigation of how dierent agents could contribute to surface water flood risk reduction.
Looking at the percentage of houses in the model protected by dierent flood protection measures gives an
indication of the level of investment made in PLPMs by agents, both proactive and reactive, and investment in
SUDS made by the local government and the developer. Figure 3 highlights that for PLPMs most investments
aremadeproactively rather than reactively over time. This is because reactive investments only occur following
a flood event and the government budget for grants in any year is limited. The developer steadily invests in
flood defences over the years whilst developing houses. The largest percentage of houses protected by flood
protection measures are covered by investments by the local government, although the range in results varies
the most (represented by the green dots). In the first 10 years the local government mostly invests in flood
defences in the same way over all runs. However, aer this point a large range can be seen reflecting how the
local government reacts to flood events of dierent magnitude and frequency in the runs, and their decisions
to invest more or less of their budget in SUDS projects.
4.2 Figure 4 shows how these investments act to reduce flood damage to houses in themodel. In contrast to Figure
3 the greatest economic benefits result fromdeveloper investment. This reflects the fact that developers build a
lot of newproperties in areas of high flood risk in themodel, where flood damageswould be relatively high and
so defences have a large benefit. The percentage of houses protected by local government flood defences and
proactive investments in PLPMs are similar (Figure 3), and the reduction in flood damages also remains similar
(Figure 4). This is even though flood defences are assumed to reduce flood damage by 35% (Defra 2011) com-
pared to PLPMs which are assumed to reduce damage by 75% (Thurston et al. 2008). This reflects the rationale
of the local government to build flood defence projects in the highest risk areas where economic benefits are
greatest, compared topeoplewhowill invest in PLPMs in a less rationalmanner reflecting anxiety and emotions
(Harries 2012). This is illustrated in Figure 5 which showsmodelled flood risk maps for Camden at the start of a
singlemodel run, and the spatial pattern of investment in flood protectionmeasures. Government investments
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Figure 3: The percentage of houses protected by flood protection measures over time. The lines represent re-
sults averaged across each of the 300model repetitions (dots).
Figure 4: Eect of flood protection measures on the reduction of flood damages
focus on the areas in the study area that have the highest flood risk, while investments in PLPMs appear to be
more random.
4.3 Figure 6 highlights the positive eect that flood protection measures have on the level of flood risk houses are
in, disaggregated by existing houses and newly developed houses (in the first 4 years no developer houses are
built). New houses see benefits from flood protection measures straight away as from the start the developer
builds a lot in high risk areas where the highest profits can be reached. This is particularly important given that
newproperties built post-2009will not be eligible for the forthcoming Flood Re scheme, and as suchwill not be
guaranteed aordable flood insurance if they are at high risk. For initial houses in themodel the eect of flood
defences on flood risk increases gradually over timeas investment increases. However, in both cases theoverall
trend in flood risk still increaseswithandwithout floodprotectionmeasures. This reflects thecumulativeeects
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Figure 5: The le image shows flood risk in Camden at the start of a single model run (darker blue indicates
higher flood risk). The right image shows the spatial pattern of investment in flood protection (red reflects
investments in flood defences by the local government; purple shows PLPM investments; and green reflects
properties that have both).
Figure 6: Eect of flood protection measures on the average flood risk over time.
of flood events, the continued development of properties in areas of flood risk, and the annual inflation related
increase in flood damages used to calculate flood risk in this version of the ABM.
Flood insurance schemes
4.4 The second area of investigation focuses on the specific role of the Flood Re scheme. Given the way in which
Flood Re is designed to work we test its ability to cover high flood risk houses andmake insurancemore aord-
able. Figure 7 shows the annual trend in the percentage of all houses in flood risk whichwould be re-insured by
Flood Re. Initially only about 5% of houses in flood risk are re-insured by Flood Re. However, with increasing
flood risk (e.g. Figure 6) and the associated increase in flood insurance premiums (Figure 8) the trend quickly
increases over the first ten years. The percentage of houses in flood risk re-insured into Flood Re then remains
relatively constant, declining from around 90% to 75%. This decline reflects the continuing development of
houses, oen in areas of high flood risk, which contribute to the overall flood risk of the study area but are not
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Figure 7: Percentage of flood risk houses re-insured in Flood Re over time.
Figure 8: Eect of Flood Re on the average flood insurance premium over time.
eligible for the Flood Re scheme.
4.5 Figure 8 shows themain eect of the Flood Re schemewhen it is combinedwith existing flood insurance. Flood
Re is shown to lower the flood insurance premiums of high risk properties significantly. Where initially the
average insurance premium increased from an average of £75 to £400 in 30 years, Flood Re more than halves
this to an average of around £170 aer 30 years. The upward trend seenhere also comes fromnewhouses being
built by the developer in areas at risk of surface water flooding, which are not eligible for the Flood Re scheme.
This supports themain aimof Flood Re to lower flood insurance premiums and suggests themodel is capturing
the main function of the scheme correctly.
4.6 Finally,weexplore the interactionsbetweenFloodReand investment in floodprotectionmeasures. While Flood
Re does not directly incentivise investment in PLPMs or SUDS Figure 8 highlights a positive feedback. Fewer
properties are re-insured into Flood Re when such flood risk reduction measures are in place. This is as PLPMs
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Figure 9: The eect of flood protection measures on the percentage of houses re-insured into Flood Re over
time.
and/or SUDS are accounted for when estimating the potential damage to properties aected by flooding, and
consequently lowers the insurer’s estimate of flood risk of protected properties and in some cases the need to
place the property into Flood Re. In these simulations a combination of SUDS and PLPMs are shown to bemost
beneficial in terms of reducing the number of properties which are placed into Flood Re. This highlights the
importance of investing in surface water riskmanagement if the viability of flood insurance is to bemaintained
in the future.
Discussion and Conclusions
5.1 The paper presents an ABM developed to model the dynamics of surface water flooding, changing surface wa-
ter flood risk, and how adaptation and insurance decisions could aect future surface water flood risk in that
dynamic. While the focus of this paper is a case study of Camden the ABM is applicable to the broader situa-
tion in Greater London and could be extended to other areas in the UK or specific situations in other countries
(dependent on availability of relevant data and computational resources). The analysis is novel due to its dy-
namic nature and as dierent combinations of surface water flood risk management options can bemodelled,
to include structural adaptation options, insurance, and the specific case of Flood Re.
5.2 Filatova (2015) highlight the need tomove from conceptual modelling experiments to simulating real life situa-
tions through the use of available data. Both KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) and KIDS (Keep It Descriptive Stupid)
models have benefits and disadvantages. In this study we follow the KIDS approach to help facilitate real life
policy testing. One downside of this approach is that ABMs inevitability becomemore complex and can forego
comprehensibility and transparency. The systematic approach to recording assumptions and extensive veri-
fication eorts (e.g. see documentation available at https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/1/view)
work to limit the problems of transparency. Additionally, the physical limits to agent behaviour provided by
the detailed GIS data and floodmaps further strengthen the realism of the model.
5.3 The paper demonstrates how the ABM captures essential features of the flood insurance scheme and flood
protection investments. While it has not been possible to validate themodel in terms of the Flood Re system (it
is due to begin in April 2016) the overall patterns of behaviour shown by the ABM are in line with the available
literature, real world data for London and Camden, and expert opinions. In the creation of the model dierent
expertswere consulted to provide expert knowledge, opinions, and feedback to help parameterise and validate
the model, and the process has been strengthened by ongoing stakeholder input and interaction.
5.4 A second limitation, as with all ABMs, is that the results must be carefully interpreted given the underlying as-
sumptions which are necessary given the model complexity. Nevertheless, the ability of the framework to in-
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corporate dierent agentswith their ownbehaviours; flexibility for testing dierent conditions and behavioural
rules; flexibility to test and evaluate dierent policies and options; and the ability to visualise and quantify this
in a spatial and dynamic manner, highlights the potential benefits of such an approach to support and inform
decisionmakingwith regard to surfacewater flood riskandmanagement strategies. Theuser interfacehasbeen
developed in suchaway that allowsdierent policies, combinationsof policies, agent behaviours,mechanisms
of the Flood Re scheme, and research questions to be easily explored.
5.5 In particular, themodel is timely in its contribution to the assessment of the existing public-private partnership
and the Flood Re scheme, which have until now received insuicient attention due to lack of data or analysis.
Based on the future scenarios of climate change and surface water flood events, analysis has been undertaken
to explore the implications of future climate changeon theproposedFloodRe scheme. The results havebeenof
interest to stakeholders, and reported in the recent Prudential Regulation Authority (2015) report on the impact
of climate changeon theUK Insurance sector. Applications also includean integratedassessmentof surfacewa-
ter flood risk andmanagement strategies under future climate change, which focuses on the interplay between
dierent adaptation options; how risk reduction could be achieved by homeowners and government; and the
role of flood insurance and the new flood insurance pool, Flood Re, in the context of climate change (Jenkins
et al.). Thirdly, themodel has been used to assess the role of the current insurance partnership for incentivising
resilience under future climate change, challenges faced, and how the inclusion of other agents, such as local
developers, could enhance the risk reduction potential and future resilience of the Flood Re scheme. This in-
cludes an assessment of the role of dierent agents andhow they could adapt their behaviour to address future
risks (Jenkins et al. 2015). Lastly, an area of ongoing research is focused on testing themechanisms of the Flood
Re scheme and dierent transition options back to risk based pricing.
5.6 Overall the ABMhas highlighted how socio-economic development can exacerbate current levels of surfacewa-
ter flood risk in Camden,with an increase in the average risk to properties in themodel. Our analysis of dierent
response mechanisms and interventions indicates that the implementation of SUDS and PLPMs are beneficial
for reducing surface water flood risk. However, even with SUDS and PLPMs in place the average surface water
flood risk continued to increase over time. Given the potential implications of climate change this illustrates
the danger of further trade-os between future development plans and flood risk management and need for
further investigation in this area.
5.7 The model also highlighted that Flood Re would achieve its aim of securing aordable flood insurance premi-
ums. However, Flood Re has no additional benefits in terms of overall risk reduction. This reflects concerns
that the new scheme is missing an opportunity to contribute to risk reduction, which is important to its own
resilience under future climate change. As such, the ABM is well suited to investigate how extensions andmod-
ifications to the proposed Flood Re scheme could better facilitate risk reduction.
5.8 The above issues and questions are all highly relevant aspects for the ongoing regulatory and political approval
process for Flood Re, which have until now received insuicient attention due to lack of data or analysis. The
development of the ABM addresses this gap and future findings are expected to provide important input to the
current discussion about the design and operation of Flood Re, particularly with regards to incentivizing flood
risk reduction measures.
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Purpose
The purpose of the model is to investigate the role of flood protection measures in risk reduction, the working
of the existing public-private flood insurance partnership in the UK and the proposed new insurance scheme
Flood Re and how these schemes can be used to incentivize risk management.
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Entities, state variables and scales
Environment
Variable name Brief description
Percentage of houses for sale at
the start
The percentage of houses for which home sellers will be created at the
start
Mortgage interest The annual interest that is charged over a mortgage of a person
Mortgage term The number of years (ticks) in which the person pays o his mortgage
Average flat value The initial average value (in pounds) for the house type flat
Average terraced value The initial average value (in pounds) for the house type terraced
Average semi -detached value The initial average value (in pounds) for the house type semi-detached
Average detached value The initial average value (in pounds) for the house type detached
Owner warning time The number of years (ticks) a homeowner will pay more than he can af-
ford on his house before putting his house up for sale
Number of trade actions The number of times a homebuyer or home seller sets a price within a
trade round
Housing ratio increase The percentage with which the housing ratio of a person is increased
compared to the calculated mortgage ratio of that person
Land value percentage The percentage of a house value that initially can be seen as the land
value. The rest is the building value of the house
Immigration percentage The percentage of new homebuyers that enter the market every year
Percentage of movers The annual percentage of persons that decide to sell their house be-
cause they want to move to a dierent house
Flood risk consider probability the probability that a person will consider flood risk when buying a
house
No selling decrease value per-
centage
The percentagewithwhich the asking price of a housewill be decreased
at the end of a year when no buyer was found for it
Inflation percentage Thepercentagewithwhich apersonâĂŹs incomewill be increasedevery
year to account for inflation
Percentage of proactive PLPM in-
vestors
The percentage of persons that will be labelled a proactive PLPM in-
vestor
Percentage of reactive PLPM in-
vestors
The percentage of persons that will be labelled a reactive PLPM investor
PLPM investment flood protec-
tion benefit
The amount with which the flood protection of a house increase when
the owner has invested in PLPMs for it
Flood protection budget The annual amount of money (pounds) the local government gets from
the national government to invest in flood protection
Cost of flood defences The cost of building flood defences for a single house
Flood defence investment flood
protection benefit
The amount with which the flood protection of a house increase when
the local government builds flood defences for it
Flood Re Assets The amount of assets in the FloodRe system
Flood Re Levy The levy that is taken from all flood insurance premiums to pay for the
Flood Re system
Land value Assigned to every patch in the model. It indicates the value a piece of
land (patch) has on the market
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Agents
Persons
Variable name Brief description
Homeowner? True if the person owns a house he does not want to sell
Home seller? True if the person owns a house that he wants to sell
Homebuyer? True if the person does not own a house but wants to buy one
Income The amount of money a person earns annually
Housing ratio The percentage of a person’s income that he can aord to spent on his
house
Mortgage ratio Thepercentageof aperson’s income thathe canaord to spentonmort-
gage payments
Number of incomes as downpay-
ment
The number of incomes a person can pay as a downpaymentwhenbuy-
ing a house
Percentage sell price Thepercentagewithwhich apersonwill increases the house value of his
house when he puts it up for sale
Would sell house for profit? True if a person would consider selling his house for profit (10% of per-
sons would)
Profit percentage The percentage a person’s house need to be worth extra compared to
what he bought it for, before he decides to sell it for profit
Maximum house price Themaximum price a homebuyer can spent on buying a new house
Seller ask price The price a home seller asks for his house
Annual fee The annual fee a person needs to pay for the house he owns
Flood risk consideration status? True is the person considers flood risk when buying a house
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Houses
Variable name Brief description
House type The type the house is (flats, terraced, semi-detached or detached)
House value The value of the house
Initial house value The initial value of a house (at model start or when build)
Building value The value of the building part of a house (The house value is equal to the
building value + the land value of the patch the house is on)
Build year The year the house was built
Flood damage history list A list of all the years the house has previously been damaged by a flood
Person owned? True if the house is owned by a person that does not want to sell it
(homeowner)
Person onmarket? True if the house is owned by a homeowner that does want to sell it
(home seller)
Bank owned? True if the house is owned by the bank
In construction? True during the time the house is constructed by the developer
Developer owned? True if the house is owned by the developer
Council tax band The council tax band the house is assigned to
Property tax fee The annual fee that has to be paid on property taxes for the house
Annual fee list A list of fees the owner of a house has to pay on an annual basis
Fee duration list A list of remaining time of each fees set in the annual fee list
Mortgage fee The annual fee that has to be paid over the mortgage a person took for
buying a house
Ageing repair fee The annual fee that has to be spend on repairing a house from ageing
House value at buy The house value of a house when it is bought
Flood damage list A list with flood repair fees for every given flood return period
Flood status? True if the house is flooded this year (tick)
Flood repair fee The fee that has to be spend on repairing a house aer flood damage
(taken from the flood damage list)
Flood risk An evaluation of the flood risk a house is in
Flood insurance status? True if the house is insured against flooding
Flood insurance premium The annual fee that has to be paid to insure the house against floods
Flood insurance excess percent-
age
The percentage of flood damage that is not covered by insurance and
needs to be paid by the owner of the house
Flood insurance excess The amount of flood damage to a house that is not covered by flood in-
surance
Flood protection level The level (a value between 0 and 1) with which the damage done to a
house by a flood is lowered because protection measures have been
taken for this house
Re-insured to Flood Re status? True if the house is re-insured in Flood Re
Flood Re insurer cost The amount of money (pounds) the insurer has to pay to the FloodRe
system for re-insuring this house
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Insurer
Variable name Brief description
Insurer assets The amount of assets the insurer has
Initial flood insurance excess The initial flood insurance excess a person has to pay on his insurance
Flood excess increase because of flooding The amount with which a person’s excess will in-
crease when his house is hit by a flood
Expected average annual loss The losses the insurer expects tomake in the current tick from compen-
sating flood damages.
Current loss ratio The current loss ratio (total compensation pay outs / total premium in-
comes) of the insurer
Maximum acceptable loss ratio A fractiondescribing themaximum loss ratio that the insurer is prepared
to accept
Base flood insurance premium The base flood insurance premium that every house has to pay
Bank
Variable name Brief description
Bank assets The amount of assets the bank has
Developer
Variable name Brief description
Developer assets The amount of assets the developer has
Proposed land The patch of land the developer is proposing to build a house on
Proposed house type The house type the developer is proposing to build
Proposed house value The value of the house the developer is proposing to build
Proposed land value The land value under the house the developer is proposing to build on
Proposed building value The building value of the house the developer is proposing to build
Proposed council tax band The council tax band of the house the developer is proposing to build
Proposed property tax fee The property tax fee of the house the developer is proposing to build
Proposed flood damage list The flood damage list of the house the developer is proposing to build
Proposed flood risk The flood risk of the house the developer is proposing to build
Income cost ratio for develop-
ment
The ratio of income vs. cost the developer wants to reach by building a
house
Development approval status? The status of the approval of the development plan the developer send
to the local government (true if the proposal is approved)
Build time The time it takes the developer to build a house
Proposed Flood Re insurer cost The proposed Flood Re insurer cost of the house the developer is
proposing to build
JASSS, 20(1) 6, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3135
Local government
Variable name Brief description
Local government assets The amount of assets the local government has
Percentage of land sales used for
flood defences
The percentage of land sale income that goes towards the flood protec-
tion budget
Percentage of property taxes
used for flood defences
The percentage of property tax income that goes towards the flood pro-
tection budget
Maximum fraction of value at risk Themaximum fraction of house values that can be at risk before the lo-
cal government starts acting (building flood defences)
Number of projects in flood de-
fence portfolio
The number of project the local governmentwill look at before deciding
on projects to build
Minimum houses in flood de-
fence project
The minimum number of houses that should be in a flood defence
project
Flood defence portfolio The portfolio with flood defence project to choose from
Wanted benefit-cost ratio The benefit cost ratio a local government want to get from a flood de-
fence project
Maximum flood risk The flood risk that the local governmentwill accept as themaximumrisk
a house can be in to approve a development proposal
Development approval ratio Themaximum ratio between the value of flood risk a house adds to that
of the total municipality and the profit the local government will gain,
for the local government to approve a development proposal
Development proposal status? The statusof adevelopmentproposal sent to the local government (true
if evaluation is requested)
One time step represents a year to allow the consequences of a flood as well as the reaction of the housing
market to be investigated. Simulations were run for 30 years. Flood events were simulated using flood event
time series data generated using an urban spatial weather generator.
BasedonGISdata anoutline of theBoroughof Camden,major parks andareas of opportunity for thedeveloper
to build houses in are outlined. Also based on GIS data 95,561 initial houses are positioned on a grid of 300 by
300 patches. Because of the size of the housing data set and the amount of available patches, a patch can have
two houses of dierent house types assigned to it. Each flat consist of 15 houses that are placed on top of each
other. Only oneof these houses is assigned to be at the bottom level andwill be at risk of surfacewater flooding.
Process overview and scheduling
Because of the size and complexity of the model the full process overview will not be given here. However, an
extensive overview of all the behaviours in themodel, their explanation and their pseudo code can be found in
appendix D of Dubbelboer (2014). Besides this the model code is also published on OpenABM
(https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/1/view).
To give an overview of the process and scheduling of themodel, the order in which all actions within themodel
are performed is given here:
Setup
First the environment is set up. Aer this the insurer is set up because it provides information that houses need
when they get set up. Aer houses are set up persons can be set up and directly move into houses. Aer this





JASSS, 20(1) 6, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3135
• Setup bank
• Setup developer
• Setup local government
Go
The go procedure is a bit more complex than the setup and goes as follows:
• First the flood event action of the environmentwill be run. This is done first because it provides informa-
tion on flooding in the current year that is used by all agents
• Aer this the process house action of houses will be run because in this action houses gather and com-
pute data that is used by the persons in the model. Within the action of processing houses the following
actions are run by each house individually
– Calculate flood risk (house action)
– Set flood insurance premium and excess (insurer action)
* Calculate expected average annual loss (insurer action)
* Decide on re-insuring in Flood Re (insurer action)
– House flood repair (house action)
• Aer the houses are processed, the process person action of persons will be run. Within the action of
processing persons the following actions are run by each person individually:
– Decide on house selling (person action)
* Foreclose house or sell on market (person actions)
– Invest in PLPMs (person action)
– Correct income for inflation (person action)
• Aer the persons are processed the process insurer action of the insurer will be run. Within the action of
processing the insurer the following actions are also run by the insurer:
– Compensate policy holders (insurer action)
– Calculate current loss ratio (insurer action)
– Adjust insurer assets (insurer action)
• Now that the houses, persons and insurer have gathered and computed all needed data the processmar-
ket actionof the environment canbe run. Within theactionof processing themarket the followingactions
are also run:
– Developer market run (environment action)
* Set maximum aordable house price (person action)
* Disconnect seller from house if buyer is found (houses action)
* House buyer enters house (person action)
· Set flood insurance (person action)
· Set mortgage fee (house action)
* Update land values based on the made transaction (environment action)
– Personmarket run (environment action)
* Same actions as in developer market run above
– Bankmarket run (environment action)
* Same actions as in developer market run above
– Update building value based on the total of all made transactions (environment action)
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• Now that the market is run the process bank action of the bank can be run. This needs to be done aer
themarket because the bank needs to process the houses it just bought on themarket. Within the action
of processing the bank the following actions are run:
– Bank flood insurance set
– Bankmaintain house
• Now the local government and developer actions are run. The process developer action of the developer
will first be run so that they can pass information on proposed developments to the local government.
Within the action of processing the developer the following actions are also run:
– Locate land for development (developer action)
– Decide to create development proposal (developer action)
– Evaluate development proposal (local government action)
– Develop housing (developer action)
– Finish house construction (developer action)
– Developer flood insurance set (developer action)
– Developer maintain houses (developer action)
• Aer the developer is processed the process local government action will be run. Within the action of
processing the local government the following actions are also run:
– Collect property taxes (local government action)
– Collect flood protection Investment (local government action)
– Decide on building flood defences (local government action)
– Build flood defences (local government action)
Design concepts
Basic principles: The model takes a microeconomic model of a US double auction market, adapts it to the UK
situation and extends it to include amore elaborate insurance system and a larger focus on the role of housing
developments and the local government in regards to flood risk management.
Emergence: This model was designed to explore the reaction of a housing market to flood risk and the uptake
of flood protection measures under dierent circumstances. Transaction prices and person selling behaviour
are modelled as emerging behaviour resulting from changes in agent characteristics and the surrounding en-
vironment. Behaviour of the local government to invest in flood protection emerges from changing patterns
of flood risk in the model. Investing in PLPMs is less emerging as it is based on set states and flood events,
but becomes more so when dierent insurance scheme policies are tested in the model. Lastly, decisions of
the insurer to place a person in Flood Re is emergent, resulting from changing flood risk patterns that lead to
changing insurance premiums and excesses for the policy holder.
Adaptation: Home owners who proactively invest in PLPMs will experience less loss from a flood event. Home
owners who reactively invest only see benefits when a second flood occurs. Home buyers that consider flood
riskwill not buy houses that have recently been flooded, putting them in less flood risk. Insurers react to a flood
event by increasing the flood insurance excess of people hit by the flood, better covering their flood risk in the
future. Based on the flood risk within its municipality the local government build flood defences to protect
homeowners, lowering any damage from future flood events.
Objectives: Homebuyers want to get the best aordable property. Home owners want to live in a house they
can aord for as long as possible and want to feel safe. Home sellers want to sell their house for a price higher
than the housesmarket value. The insurer wants tomake profit while providing everyonewith aordable flood
insurance. Thedeveloperwants tomakeaprofit by sellinghouses for ahigher price than thebuilding cost them.
The local governmentwants to protect people living in theirmunicipality by building flooddefences, andwants
to keep up with the high housing demand set by the national government.
Learning: Whena floodevent occurs somepeoplewill invest in PLPMs. Aer a floodevent the local government
also invests in flood defences in the aected area.
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Predictions: People invest in PLPMs and the local government invests in flood defences because they predict
that a flood event will again occur in the future. The insurer calculates flood insurance premiums and excesses
by predicting the probabilities of flood events occurring in the future. The developer develops houses by pre-
dicting the future demand for housing.
Sensing: Agents within the FloodRe model save all information that has previously been provided to them
and they make decisions based on this. Besides this, every agent maximizes his utility, being able to perfectly
calculate the result of every action. Information is complete and certain and agents behave in a rational way.
Interaction: Persons, the bank and the developer interact whit each other in the housingmarket when houses
are sold and bought. People interact with the house they own to get information on its current state and value.
When a person takes flood insurance he interacts with the insurer, aer which the insurer interacts with the
house to gather information on the basis of which the flood insurance premium and excess is set. The local
government interacts with houses when it builds flood defences for them. The developer interacts with the
local government when it wants a development proposal to be approved.
Stochasticity: Certain values of states are stochastically assigned tomake it represent the variabilitywithin the
real world.
Collectives: Houses are grouped into types, indicating whether the house is a flat, terraced, semi-detached or
detached property. Based onmarket transactions the values of all houses of a certain typewill be updated. Per-
sons are grouped into homeowners, home seller and homebuyers. Within the housingmarket the homebuyers
and home sellers interact with each other.
Observation: Data is collectedonanannual basis. Data gathered includes: House values; thenumberof houses
put on sale and the reason for selling; flood risk; flood insurance premium and excess value; flood repair fees;
the number of houses re-insured in Flood Re; the number of PLPM investments; and the number of houses for
which flood defences are built. Average values are calculated based on the number of houses and people in the
model. Data is analysed using the data analysis tool R.
Initialization
The initial set up environment consists of 95,561 houses that are placed on a grid according to GIS data. Every
house gets a person assigned to them and a single insurer, bank, developer and local government are set up.
This is the same in every simulation run.
The states the agents get assigned can however vary. Although most states are set the same every time for
every agent, some states are stochastically assigned to allow themodel to better represent the real world. This
is done in placeswhere limited informationwas available. For instancemarket values for each individual house
are not know, just an average house value for each of the 4 house types in the study area. Because every house
of the same house type does not have the same value every house gets a value assigned to it based on a normal
distribution over this average.
A full overview of the description of the initialization of the model can be found in appendix D of Dubbelboer
(2015) and the model code is also published on OpenABM
(https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/1/view).
Input
Themodel uses data sets provided by the London Datastore; the Oice for National Statistics; residential build-
ing data from Landmap (2014); derived data from the UK Buildings Residential Building Class Dataset3; surface
water flood depth maps from the DrainLondon project led by the Greater London Authority; and flood depth-
damage functions for short (<12hr) duration floods (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010). Besides this many sources
are used for assigning specific values to states of agents. A full overview of all input data and their sources can
be found in appendix L of Dubbelboer (2014).
Submodels
Because of the size and complexity of the model the full process overview will not be given here. However, an
extensive overview of all the behaviours in themodel, their explanation and their pseudo code can be found in
appendix D of Dubbelboer (2014). The model code is also published on OpenABM
(https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/1/view).
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Notes
1The GeoInformation group data ®copyright by The GeoInformation®Group, 2014 Licence No. 3786.
2Wemodel houses as separate agents as they need to be able to behave independently fromeach other and
the person agent. They respond towhat is happening in themodel even if they are not owned, such as being hit
by a flood. A single patch can contain multiple houses, and a single building footprint multiple dwellings (e.g.
a block of flats.)
3The GeoInformation group data ®copyright by The GeoInformation®Group, 2014 Licence No. 3786.
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